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Willi Paul Adamst
This detailed and solid account of what legislators, judges, and
jurists said about the law of citizenship in the United States before
1870 reaches a sad termination with the acknowledgment of failure:
failure of reason in the face of power. "Ultimately," James Kettner
concludes, "the questions of community, power, and sovereignty so
integrally bound up with the concept [of citizenship] would be
decided not by the rule of law, but by the verdict of armed force." '
In the 1857 opinion of Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 the Supreme Court
finally took its stand against the claims of the black inhabitants of
the United States, both slave and free, in the struggle to secure
their rights. It was then obvious that even the judicial branch of the
federal government would be unable to provide a nationally acceptable solution to the bitter sectional conflict.
The guardian of the Constitution failed to reconcile the clash
of values in the political culture of which it was a part. The Court
merely referred to the same apologetic concept of "constituent
member" used by the author of the Virginia Bill of Rights three
generations before when he faced the inconsistency of slavery among
a free people: in 1775, George Mason explained that only "those
constituent members from whom authority originated" had to be
consulted "for their approbation or dissent"; he took them to stand
for "the body of the people." ' 3 And so in 1857, Chief Justice Taney,
speaking for a majority of the Court, announced that a black man,
born in the United States, could not claim the rights and privileges
secured to citizens by the Constitution.' Although such a person
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might well be a citizen of one of the individual states, the Chief
Justice declared, he could not be a citizen of the United States, as
that term is used in the Constitution, because the framers of that
document would not have considered him "a constituent member
of this sovereignty." 5
Kettner amply demonstrates that the law of citizenship
throughout American history reflected the pervasive social values of
American society, a society of various nationalities, several races,
and many cultures. The author, trained as a historian of ideas (he
acknowledges Bernard Bailyn as his "chief intellectual creditor"'),
reconstructs the patterns of thought to which judges and legislators
appealed when they were faced with questions concerning subjectship, citizenship, or nationality. The major contribution of the book
is thus its comprehensive chronological explication of legal doctrine,
based on firsthand knowledge of the extensive source material: state
and federal case reports and statutes, as well as the existing legal
and historical literature. The book does not advance a controversial
thesis. Herbert Baxter Adams and Frederick Jackson Turner would
have been delighted to find their view of American history so convincingly corroborated. In the field of legal history, too, Kettner
shows that English institutions, ideas, and habits were gradually
transformed into a genuinely American product by confrontation
with the New World environment.
Subjectship, citizenship, and nationality, in the modern senses
of those terms, developed, of course, only upon the emergence of the
modern territorially defined state. With the establishment of the
modern state, place of birth and residence replaced the feudal concepts of personal and "natural" allegiance between a ruler and those
under his protection as the determinants of political affiliation. The
first fully developed theory of English subjectship in modern times
was presented by Sir Edward Coke in 1608 as part of his opinion in
Calvin's Case.7 When James VI of Scotland became James I of
England, the question arose whether his Scottish subjects were also
to be considered naturalized English subjects. Coke insisted that
the allegiance and obedience a person owed to the sovereign in
whose territory
he happened to be born was "natural" and
"perpetual." ' This allegiance, furthermore, was to the person of the
Id. at 404, quoted in KETrNER at 326.
KmrTNER at xi.
7 Coke's Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (Exch. Ch. 1608).
KerNER at 28.
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monarch,, not to the crown as a legal construct? Hence only Scotsmen born after James's succession to the crown of England were
natural-born subjects of the king of England. 0 Coke recognized Parliament's right to declare an alien a natural-born subject" (hence
the term "naturalization"). The king had the power only to declare
an alien a denizen, 2 a title which enabled one to own, but not to
bequeath, the land one held, and which provided no political
rights. 3 This case and others that are part of the English background of American citizenship are clearly presented by Kettner in
the prologue and in chapter 1.
The revolutions of the seventeenth century, Kettner found, had
little effect on the law of citizenship, naturalization, and treason,
although Whig contract thinking was logically incompatible with
the hierarchical society and supposedly natural order that underlay
Coke's notion of a perpetual allegiance (chapters 2 and 3). Courts
continued to apply the maxim "once an Englishman, always an
Englishman," or in the words of a striking judicial pronouncement
of 1747, "It is not within the power of any private subject to shake
off his allegiance, and to transfer it to a foreign prince." 4 Blackstone's Commentaries also adhered to this view.15 Kettner persuasively suggests that the logical integrity of the English law of allegiance decreased in the face of Whig political theory in the course
of the eighteenth century. 6 To the historian of ideas, the judges'
stubborn adherence to precedents from another epoch of political
belief represents an instance of intellectual incongruity that threatens his faith in logical connections between political and social beliefs and realities.
Given the English judges' and legislators' inability or unwillingness to adjust to the basic tenets of the Glorious Revolution at home,
it is not surprising to find them slow to recognize and meet the
special needs of an expanding empire and maturing colonies. While
English migrants to the colonies and their descendants remained
subjects of the king of England, non-English settlers in the colonies
' Id. at 21.

,0 Id. at 22.
" Id. at 27.
12 Id.
"

Id. at 34.

Id. at 51 (quoting Macdonald's Case, Foster 59, 60, 168 Eng. Rep. 30, 30 (K.B. 1747)).
KETTNER at 55 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES *369 ("For it is a principle
of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince cannot by any act of his own,
no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his allegiance to the former")).
11See KETTNER at 59-60.
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faced a confusing and frequently changing variety of means to establish allegiance (chapters 4 and 5). One possibility was the costly
and difficult procedure of naturalization by private act of Parliament.17 An easier way, that sufficed for many merchants who merely
wanted to secure trading rights, was denization by royal letters
patent. 8 A general naturalization act, which greatly simplified the
procedure in the colonies by allowing courts to administer the oath
of allegiance, was in force only briefly from 1709 to 1712.19 Although
the Act's exclusion of Catholics, Jews, and other non-Christians
from naturalization conformed to prevailing Tory views, the Tories
nevertheless strongly opposed the act and abolished it as soon as
they won a majority in Parliament."° Only in 1740 did Parliament
finally enact a statute providing a workable naturalization procedure.2' The act empowered colonial courts to administer the oath of
allegiance to an alien after a residence of seven years; it had an
unusual set of restrictions, excluding Catholics but not Quakers and
22
Jews.
In 1773, Parliament strictly set off naturalization in the colonies
from naturalization in the mother country by declaring that the new
subjects did not qualify to inherit land or hold public office in Great
Britain and Ireland.2 In 1773, colonial legislatures were also forbidden to continue imitating Parliament by passing naturalization
bills.2 4 Kettner does not explain why Parliament acted only in 1773,
although colonial assemblies had been naturalizing immigrants ever
since the need to do so had arisen with the first settlements in
Virginia. The assemblies' "Quest for Power" 25 might also have usefully been discussed in this connection.
Kettner's findings in both chapters 4 and 5 support the general
assumption that liberal naturalization and property laws, together
with a relative openness to groups of various religious persuasions,
were important factors in making a colony attractive for immi"1Id. at 66-67.
, See id. at 68.
" Id. at 70-72 (citing An Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1709, 7 Anne, c. 5).
20 KETrNER at 70-72.
2! Id. at 74 (citing An Act for naturalizing such foreign Protestants, and others therein
mentioned, as are settled, or shall settle, in any of his Majesty's Colonies in America, 1740,
13 Geo. 2, c. 7).
2 KETrNER at 74.
23Id. at 77 (citing Act of 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 25).
24 KErrNER at 105 ("[An order of council fixed the new policy, requiring that colonial
governors be instructed not to assent to any more naturalization acts.").
" See J. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HousES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689-1776 (1963).
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grants. If both chapters had been integrated, some duplication and
cross-references would have been avoided.
Political rights were not yet an integral part of the concept of
subjectship in the colonies. For example, Jewish immigrants were
naturalized by New York's assembly, 2 but in 1737 they were denied
the right to vote. 27 Laws of South Carolina and Maryland disqualified naturalized subjects from running for public office.2 8 From
Kettner's findings it seems that aliens usually wanted to swear allegiance to the king of England not so much because they wanted to
become responsible citizens but rather because they wanted to be
responsible parents: property of aliens escheated to the king and
29
had to be regrantbd, for a fee.
After the Seven Years War the struggle over colonial self-rule
concerned the rights of natural-born subjects, not those of immigrants. Kettner's analysis of the imperial crisis (chapter 6) supports
Bailyn's view 3° of the American founders as reluctant ideologues
who merely provided after-the-fact justifications for changes that
had in reality already taken place. Kettner makes it clear that colonial lawyers and legislators were no great theoreticians and were
only forced by the circumstances of life in the colonies to rethink
and finally reject English solutions. From this point of view, it was
the British side that was inflexible, whereas the Americans were the
practical realists who recognized that the empire was not a nationstate. They were aware that they had outgrown the status of a
"discovered" colony whose inhabitants, although guaranteed "the
retention of English rights," were nevertheless ruled by a Parliament in which they were not represented .3 Although the colonists
did not publicly question allegiance to the king until January 1776,
they contended that the colonial assemblies were the only legislatures authorized to regulate interior problems such as taxation.
Even allegiance to the person of George III, they argued, was conditional upon the protection he provided. 3 A king could break the
compact with his subjects and thereby lose their allegiance, as
James II had done in 1688. 33 Coke's doctrine of perpetual allegiance
26 KEWrNER at 116.

2 Id.

Id. at 123 (citing Act of Nov. 4, 1704, no. 228, 2 S.C. Stat. 251); id. at 124.
29 KE rNER at 118-19.
10 Bailyn, Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century
America, 67 AM. HIST. REV. 339 (1962).
11 KErrNER at 155.
2 See id. at 166.
Id. at 144.
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was thus discarded; but his theory of several "dominions," such as
Scotland, Ireland, England, and Virginia, each with its own parliament and each united by allegiance
to one king, remained useful to
34
the defenders of colonial rights.
After independence, the contractual theory of allegiance appeared in a new light when applied to the opponents of that independence (chapter 7). How were those inhabitants of the new states
who decided not to change their allegiance from the monarch to the
republican regime to be treated? When did a Loyalist become a
traitor? The Continental Congress answered these questions with
the territorial principle in its most basic form: "all persons residing
within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the
laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members
of such colony.

'35

Regardless of his choice of allegiance, every inhab-

itant could be accused of treason. There were in fact hundreds of
indictments for treason, Kettner reports, but executions for treason
were "fairly rare.

136

(A comparative glance at the French Revolution

might have been particularly enlightening in this context, but
throughout the book we are not once allowed to stray from the path
of American history.) American courts recognized free choice of allegiance, a "right of election" of citizenship in a revolutionary situation, only after the War of Independence had been won.37 During the
second American civil war, the Confederacy brushed that piece of
logic aside in allowing its states to revert to the pure and simple
territorial principle.38
The state and federal constitutions and the first laws concerning naturalization and citizenship did not completely specify the
meaning of American citizenship (chapter 8). It remained unclear
what "privileges" and what "immunities" article IV of the Constitution guaranteed.39 The new Constitution gave Congress the power
only to regulate the naturalization of immigrants, 0 but left the legislatures and courts of the states free to decide under what conditions the new (as well as the old) citizens would be given the right
to vote." The American founders practiced not only the art of compromise but also that of procrastination. No matter how essential
Id. at 163-66.
Id. at 179 (citing 5 JouRNALs OF THE
11KETTNER at 182.
3 See id. at 193-96.
Id. at 337-38.
31 Id. at 231.
3'

40 Id.
41 Id.
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the question of citizenship might have been in political theory, a
fundamental lack of consensus caused them to leave it for later
generations to settle.
The increasingly bitter sectional struggle did not bypass the
judges who decided cases involving an interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause and the explosive issue of state citizenship in relation to federal citizenship (chapter 9). The environment
praised by historians as the creative force producing an American
identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became a liability, a source of deplorable inconsistencies and contradictions, in
the nineteenth century.
Between 1820 and 1860, American judges increasingly faced
questions concerning the special status of Indians and free and enslaved blacks. (Chapter 10 concerns the legal status of "Indians,
Slaves, and Free Negroes"; Kettner chose not to deal with another
citizenship issue beginning to gain momentum in this period, the
movement for women's suffrage.) Today the nineteenth-century
justifications for the dispossession and displacement of the
American Indians through manipulation of such legal concepts as
"citizenship," "allegiance," "foreign states," and "domestic dependent nations"4 2 seem an exercise in legal fiction. Kettner provides
the lawyer's view, treating the development of judicial attitudes
toward the legal status of American Indians from the seventeenth
century to 1870 in thirteen dense pages.4 3 He includes the same kind
of brief, yet instructive, survey of the legal status of blacks dating
back to the introduction of slavery as a legal category in the middle
of the seventeenth century." The very existence of free blacks presented southern judges and legislators with a dilemma: since free
blacks born in the United States were neither slaves, aliens, nor
Indians, by elimination they would have to be citizens unless the
entire concept of citizenship were reinterpreted. Yet granting them
the status of citizens would raise "complex questions about manumission that could easily challenge the idea that black slaves were
property."4 Lawyers attempted to evade the dilemma by denying
that the status of citizenship per se implied political and social
rights;" yet the notion that citizenship and allegiance necessarily
provided the protection of those rights had been one of the ideologi42

Id. at 296.

13

Id. at 288-300.

" Id. at 300-33.

,1 Id. at 312.
1 See id. at 316.
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cal foundations of the colonists' claim to self-government."
The question mark in the Epilogue's subtitle "Resolution?"
reminds us that even the Civil War did not bring about a conclusive
and legally unequivocal answer to the unresolved issues of American
citizenship. The Civil Rights Act of 186611 provided the first "clear
statutory definition of citizenship." 4' It based citizenship simply on
birth within the territory of the United States (with the exception
of Indians on reservations), and it enumerated several guaranteed
rights such as the right to make contracts, give evidence in court,
own property, and enjoy "full and equal benefit of all laws. . . , as
is enjoyed by white citizens."' 51 These principles were written into
the Constitution before the war mood had passed, against the will
51
of President Johnson and without the assent of the southern states .
Even the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, however, did not
guarantee every citizen the right to vote; "race, color or previous
condition of servitude" were merely disallowed as criteria for denying suffrage; the state legislatures were left free to apply any other
restrictive qualifications such as sex, literacy, and property. 5 With
The Slaughter-House Cases13 of 1873, the Supreme Court initiated
a series of restrictive interpretations of the fourteenth amendment.
Kettner discusses the international aspects of American citizenship in the nineteenth century only briefly, in connection with
two issues: the British insistence on "perpetual allegiance," which
supposedly justified the impressment of naturalized Americans
born in Britain, 4 and the citizenship questions arising out of the
acquisition of new territories, such as Louisiana, Texas, California,
and New Mexico, for which collective naturalization by treaty could
provide an answer.5 The Bancroft treaties of 186811 with the North
German Union and other German states, which acknowledged the
rights of naturalized as well as native-born American citizens
abroad, 5 would have formed an appropriate ending for the discus" See text and note at note 33 supra.
, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
" KETNER at 341 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27).
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, quoted in KarTNER at 341-42.
" KETrNER at 342.
= Id. at 345.
"
'

122 U.S. 636 (1873).
KErTHER at 269.
Id. at 252-53 & 253 n.15.

15 Stat. 615, 2 Malloy 1298 (1868).
See Hecker & Krakau, Die vdlkerrechtlichen Vertrdge der Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika Liber Fragen der StaatsangehbrigkeiteinschliesslichEinbargerungund Wehrpflcht,
4 VERFASSUNG UNI5 RECHT IN UBERSEE, 69, 72-73 (1971).
"
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sion of the development of naturalization in the period covered by
this study; unfortunately, they are not mentioned.
The price one pays for the advantages-of a survey that sweeps
three centuries is, of course, lack of detail-detail, for instance,
concerning the personal political interests of judges, such as those
of Justice McLean in the Dred Scott case.18 On the whole, however,
Kettner admirably succeeds in presenting cases and statutes in
their political context; no reader will put down this volume still
believing in a pure science of the law. The impact of this rich study,
which was deservedly awarded the Jamestown Prize of the Institute
of Early American History and Culture, would certainly have been
strengthened by the addition of cross-national comparisons. The
qualifications for various types of membership in various political
units, and the rights and duties associated with such membership,
have been discussed by European lawyers at least since Caracalla,
in 212 A.D., declared all free inhabitants of his empire to be cives
romani. Comparative glances at other nations the legal traditions
of which also began in England, that now also stress thejus soli, and
that also accommodate ethnically diverse populations, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, might have been
particularly useful.
58See Corwin, The Dred Scott Decision, in the Light of ContemporaryLegal Doctrines,
17 AM. HIsT. REv. 52,53 (1911) ("Justice McLean, a candidate for the Republican presidential
nomination, had determined to make political capital of the controversy").

